This paper establishes a relationship between the observability of common shocks and optimal organizational design under a multiagent moral hazard environment. The choices of organization and investment on information about common shocks are determined jointly, in a Walrasian equilibrium model where the commodities traded are memberships in organizations.
Introduction
Economic agents are often organized in cooperative groups, where they take decisions jointly and share relevant information. These cooperative arrangements, however, coexist with more individualistic, competitive regimes. Several examples show that even members of apparently similar communities, act coordinately in some cases and independently in others. Data from Indian village economies described by Townsend and Mueller (1998) and Mueller, Prescott, and Sumner (2002) , for instance, show that while some landowners have their land farmed by groups of individuals acting cooperatively, others divide up their land in several plots, and employ a single worker or family in each of them. This duality between cooperative and individualistic arrangements has also been observed in credit contracts: many microcredit arrangements are one-per-credit contracts, but recently group joint liability credit has been widely adopted in developing economies (Ahlin and Townsend, 2007) . Such variability can also be observed in developed economies: big industrial conglomerates many times coexists with smaller firms producing similar goods. In this paper, we show that the availability of information about aggregate shocks may be an important ingredient to determine if individuals will be organized one way or the other.
Our model extends the multiagent moral-hazard model of Holmström and Milgrom (1990) , Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) and Itoh (1993) in two dimensions: (i) we add the possibility of costly observability of common shocks (e.g., Holmström, 1979) , and (ii) decentralize the model as a competitive equilibrium (as in Prescott and Townsend, 2006) . The contractual advantage of cooperation comes from the fact that, when workers act cooperatively, there are incentives for mutual enforcement of optimal levels of effort. On the other hand, cooperative groups can potentially collude and make side payments to mitigate incentives. Thus, in some cases, it may be preferable to adopt individualistic relative performance agreements. In the standard model, relative performance evaluation is especially efficient when outputs are strongly correlated across agents. This result conflicts with the empirical observation that cooperative arrangements are sometimes more prevalent when outputs are highly correlated (e.g., Ahlin and Townsend, 2007) .
In our formulation, where observability of aggregate shocks is allowed, it does not necessarily hold. As agents gather information about common shocks, the information that outputs of one individual provide about the effort of others looses relevance. Indeed, we show that when common shocks are completely observed, the group regime performs better than relative performance. As in Holmström (1979) , there is a contractual gain in obtaining information about relevant information, so even when information acquisition is costly, individuals may be willing to pay for it. Costly information acquisition captures the idea that investment on observability of weather conditions and other relevant economic variables.
We follow Prescott and Townsend (2006) , where individuals trade memberships in productive organizations, and include information about (locally) common shocks as a component in each organization. The organizational affiliation of each individual and the investment on observability of common shocks are jointly determined in a competitive equilibrium model. When endogenous organization and investment on observability are jointly modeled, the relationship between organizational format and output correlation is subtler. In particular, our model shows that it is possible to explain a prevalence of cooperative arrangements when output are strongly correlated (as in the data of Ahlin and Townsend, 2007 ) using a multiagent moral hazard model with observability. On the one hand, as in the standard model, the relative performance regime would remain optimal when the outputs are highly correlated and no information investment. On the other hand, a cooperative firm with information investment (when the information cost is not too large) may emerge even when the outputs are highly correlated. Indeed, numerical results reveal that both cooperative and individualistic regimes can coexist in equilibrium. In addition, the willingness to pay for information is heterogeneous across individuals with different wealths. The interplays between wealth distribution, organization and information acquisition, as provided by our equilibrium formulation, can help interpreting cross sectional data and generate testable implications for the model.
Our results may help explaining the transitions between cooperative and individualistic regimes that are often observed. Indeed, some studies (e.g., Barkey and Van Rossem, 1997) have documented instability of organization over times. Madeira and Townsend (2008) present a dynamic model of endogenous groups where the progression of utility promises over time drives changes in inequality and wealth that originate formation and dissolution of groups 1 . In steady state, both regimes coexists, with transitions in both directions. However, this stationary persistence of transitions contracts with the waves of mass regime switching, such as the corporate mergers in the late 90's and the relatively recent proliferation of joint liability microcredit contracts. From our model, those can possibly result from advances in information technology. This paper relates to the wide development literature on risk sharing. Individuals inside our cooperative groups share risk, so they can be interpreted as risk sharing groups or networks. Although some groups of individuals achieve successful amounts of risk sharing (e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Goldstein, 2000; Grimard, 1997) , most of the empirical tests reject risk sharing within villages (e.g., Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999) .
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment, the informational structure and the process of information acquisition. Section 3 presents the two possible productive organizational regimes, and characterizes optimal arrangements within them.
It also presents theoretical and numerical results determining how optimality of organizational type relates with availability of common information. Section 4 models a Walrasian market of member-ships in the organizations characterized in section 3. The choices of investment in information and organizational affiliation are jointly determined by an equilibrium in this market. The set of Pareto optimal allocations is characterized and shown to be equal to those resulting from the competitive equilibrium. So the welfare theorems are valid in our environment. Section 5 summarizes the main results and presents the next steps in this work in progress.
The Model Economy
There are two physical commodities, a consumption good, c and a capital good, k. For simplicity, we assume that consumption can only take on finite (but possibly many) levels 2 . There is a continuum of risk averse agents which are divided into I types, each of which is indexed by i = {1, 2, . . . , I}.
Each type i consists of a α i ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the population, and i α i = 1. Each agent type i is endowed with κ i units of capital. The endowment is the main source of heterogeneity among agents.
There is a continuum of local economies where production is carried on by a fixed amount of workers. Those can be interpreted as small villages or firms. The productive technology in these local economies depend on a local underlying state of nature ω, which affects the output of all local workers. A state space Ω is the set of S states of nature, i.e., Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω S }, and P r(ω) is the probability of state ω occurring, so ω∈Ω P r(ω) = 1.
An agent i derives utility from consumption, c i , and effort, e i , according to the utility function U i (c i , e i ). The utility function is assumed to be concave and strictly increasing on c i , and decreasing on e i . Again, we assume that effort, or action, can take on finite (possibly many) values.
Output q can be produced using effort e and capital k as inputs. Again there are finite (possibly many) feasible levels of output. We assume that all agents have the same productive technology.
The production technology is however random and is given by f (q|e, k, ω), which is the probability of having output q conditional on effort e, capital k, and state ω. This probability satisfies
Note that the outputs of agents working for the same firm or local economy, which experience the same common shock ω, are possibly correlated:
This potential correlation provides useful information for incentives, especially when relative performance evaluation is an ingredient of contracts. Effort is realized before ω, and ω is not necessarily observed. But the elements of a partition of the state space Ω can be observed after the realization of output. This partition characterizes an informational regime.
Informational Regimes
An information regime is a partition of Ω, under the information technology z and is denoted by F z .
Let a subset A s ⊂ Ω be a typical member of an information structure, i. 
For a given regime F z , we can define a modified production function for each subset A s ∈ F z as (using Bayes' rule)
where P r(A s ) = ω∈As P r(ω) is the probability of having an common state in A s . In addition, this production function satisfies the following probability condition
Information Cost
The informational regime z can be thought as the amount of information available about ingredients that are relevant for local production. It could include, for instance, information about weather conditions or sectoral economic indicators. This kind of information can be obtained at some cost, so we allow for possibility that the informational partition can be made finer with some investment on information. An informational structure F z can be obtained at a cost of C(z). The cost is increasing in the accuracy of the information; C(z) ≥ C(z ′ ) for F z ⊂ F z ′ . In words, the cost is larger when the information regime is finer. This cost is assumed to be per unit of firms participating in the regime. The information cost is paid ex ante in units of capital.
Firms as Optimal Contracts: A Principal-Agent Formulation
Each individual is employed by a firm or local economy. Since workers are risk averse, they potentially benefit from risk-sharing contracts provided by a risk neutral outsider, or principal 3 . Effort is unobserved, however. Hence, there is moral hazard. As a result, it is optimal to impose output dependency of consumption in order to provide incentives. This is also the reason why it may be desirable to invest in observability of states of nature.
We consider two classes of organization determining the feasible contractual arrangements; (i) relative performance firms, and (ii) group firms.
Within a group firm, economic decisions are taken jointly between the agents. There is mutual observability of effort and side payments among workers. This is sometimes advantageous, as it allows mutual monitoring across workers: one individual will be punished by a bad performance of the others, so she will make sure that the others make the desirable amount of effort. However, mutual observability of effort is not always optimal: when outputs are too strongly correlated (which, in the current environment, means that common shocks are very important), there may be collusion among agents. Intuitively, all workers inside a firm could collude and coordinate with low effort: low output for all workers would look like a bad common shock.
Relative performance evaluation then emerges as an useful incentive tool. In relative performance firms, there is no mutual observability of efforts. Workers are placed in separate environments so they cannot share information about efforts, and each agent is rewarded separately. If one agent performs poorly compared with the others, she will be punished, while if she performs well compared with the others she will be rewarded. These comparative compensation schemes are particularly useful when outputs are highly correlated so the output of one individual is informative about the distribution of outputs of others.
In addition to organizational regime, a firm is described by the informational regime z, a capital input k, and an incentive compatible distribution of consumption. Without loss of generality, we can focus only on efficient firms, and these can be described from its organizational regime, its informational regime, its capital input, and the expected utility of each agent.
This section characterizes efficient firms, taking as given the capital input k, the informational regime z, and expected utility levels of each agent. The determination of k, z and utility promises follow from the competitive equilibrium. For expositional convenience, we assume that there are only two agents inside each firms, but this can be easily extended to the case of N agents.
3 In the general equilibrium decentralization, the outsider will be modeled as an intermediary
Relative Performance Firms
An efficient relative performance contract maximizes an expected surplus conditional on incentive and technological constraints, and also on minimal expected utility levels (outside options) for the individuals. Formally, a relative performance contract π (c, q, e, s) is the probability that each agents will receive consumption c = (c 1 , c 2 ) respectively, their realized outputs are q = (q 1 , q 2 ), their efforts are e = (e 1 , e 2 ), and the observed state is s (or A s ). We will in fact use π (c, q, e, s) as the decision variable.
The timing of events is as follows. First, each agent is randomly assigned a level of effort according to P r(e). After effort is performed, some state of nature ω ∈ A s is realized (the informational set A s is revealed), and the outputs q are obtained with probabilities determined by P r(q|e, k, s).
Then, each agent receives consumption which is randomly assigned according to P r(c|q, e, s), that is allowed to depend on the observed informational set A s . So, the decisions that are implicit in contracts are P r(e) and P r(c|q, e, s), but these two objects can be obtained from the joint distribution π(c, q, e, s) = P r(e)P r(c|q, e, s)P r(q|e, k, s)P r(s).
As a probability measure, a lottery π (c, q, e, s) must satisfy the following probability constraint:
c,q,e,s π(c, q, e, s) = 1, and π(c, q, e, s) ≥ 0, ∀(c, q, e, s)
A feasible contract π (c, q, e, s) must also be consistent with the production technology (3).
This condition is guaranteed using the following mother nature constraint. For any observed state s ∈ F z , output levels q, and for any e such that c,q,Aω π(c, q, e, s) > 0:
c π(c, q, e, s) c,q π(c, q, e, s)
where the joint production function is given by
The mother nature constraints can be rewritten as linear constraints:
Since efforts are privately observed, contracts must be incentive compatible: each agent must have incentives to perform the recommended level of effort. The incentive constraints can be formulated as:
The contract also needs to assure that individuals will get an utility level not smaller than the promised expected utility, u i . This participation constraint can be expressed as:
Since effort is performed before the observed state s is revealed, the distribution of effort must be independent of the distribution of s. That is, for any vector of effort levels e :
c,q π(c, q, e, s) = P r(A s )
c,q,s π(c, q, e, s), ∀e and s ∈ {1, ..., S z }
Constraints (5), (8) and (11) guarantee that the choosing π(c, q, e, s) is equivalent to choosing P r(e) and P r(c|q, e, s) 4 .
An optimal relative performance policy π * (c, q, e, s) solves:
subject to constraints (5)-(11).
Group Firms
Another organizational form available for the individuals in each location is the group regime, where decisions are taken jointly by both agents. Again, for a group, a contract can be characterized as P r(e) and P r(c|q, e, s). However given these objects, individuals inside a group can potentially collude and use a combination of coordinated effort levels and side payments to promote local Pareto improvements. The principal anticipate this possibility and focuses only on collusion-proof contracts. In these collusion proof contracts, whenever vectors of effort, e, and consumption, c, are recommended, it must be the case that, for a pair of given positive weights, µ 1 and µ 2 :
c,q,s P r(c|e, q, s)P r(q|e, k, s)
for any e and any c(c) ≡ [c 1 (c), c 2 (c)] such that c 1 (c) + c 2 (c) = c 1 + c 2 ≡ c A , where c A can be interpreted as the common consumption within a group. When u i is concave and separable
, this implies that c is a function of c A and µ ≡ (µ 1 , µ 2 ) given by:
s.t.
So, a group contract can be formulated as, first, the choice (possibly random) of the inside-group
Pareto weights (P r(µ)), and then the choice (possibly random) of effort (P r(e|µ)) and finally of common consumption conditional on outputs, effort and µ (P r(c A |q, e, s, µ), (the choices of µ immediately determines the whole vector c as a function of c A and µ). We will first characterize the constraints of the problem after the choice of P r(µ). Again, the choices of P r(e|µ) and P r(c A |q, e, s, µ) can now be expressed by the joint distribution (conditional on µ) π µ (c A , q, e, s) = P r(e|µ)P r(q|e, k, s)P r(c A |q, e, s, µ)P r(A s ). Again, this joint distribution, π µ , is a probability distribution, so:
Again, π µ must be subject to a mother nature constraint that guarantees consistency with the productive technology:
The incentive constraints for a group with Pareto weights µ 1 and µ 2 , which is follow directly from (13) are:
Notice that there is an unique incentive constraint for the group regime, which reflects the fact that decisions are taken jointly. The participation constraint for the group regime is:
Finally, the distribution of effort must be independent of the information set A s , so:
The problem, optimal group arrangements are thus given by:
Program 2:
s.t. (14) to (19).
Comparing Regimes
e h e l q h 0.95 0.05 q l 0.05 0.95 Table 1 : Distribution of output when ω=1: f (q|e, 1).
As it is shown by Prescott and Townsend (2002) and Madeira and Townsend (2008) , both the relative performance and the group regimes may be optimal. The relative performance regime tends to dominate for low levels of inequality and intermediary levels of surplus, while the group e h e l q h 0.5 0.5 q l 0.5 0.5 Table 3 : Joint Distribution of Outputs: f (q 1 , q2|e 1 , e2).
regime dominates for high inequality and high or low levels of surplus. In this section, we show that the optimal regime also depends on the informational state z. Proposition 1 shows that, in the symmetric case where the utility of both agents is the same, a fine enough filtration guarantees that group contracts generate higher surplus than relative performance contracts with the same utility for both agents.
Proposition 1: Suppose there are two possible levels for effort and output. Suppose also that F z = {w 1 , ..., w S } . Then, any relative performance arrangement with u 1 =u 2 generates a surplus that is not higher than some feasible contract under groups that generate the same amount of utility to the agents. Further, when the optimal level of effort under relative performance is the high one, there is a group contract that generates a higher surplus with the same utility for agents.
Proof See appendix
For the non symmetric case, we have computed some solutions suggesting that this result also holds. Using linear programming, we solved Program 1 and Program 2 for a grid of utility pairs for the agents. We assumed that u(c) = c 0.5 − e and admitted two possible values for e (high effort and low effort): e h = 4 and e l = 0. We also assumed two possible values for q (high output, or success, and low output, or failure): q h = 20 and e l = 2. We admitted two possible states, 1 and 2 (so Ω = 1, 2). The distribution of outputs conditional on effort when ω = 1 is presented in table 1. When ω = 2, it is presented in table 2. We assume that P r(ω = 1) = P r(ω = 2) = 0.5. This results in a joint distribution of the output vector conditional on the effort vector that is presented in table 3.
First we solved programs 1 and two for the case where ω is never observed. That is, we is presented in figure 1 . As in Prescott and Townsend (2002) and Madeira and Townsend (2008) , for some combinations of inequality and surplus (allocations with low inequality and intermediary levels of wealth) the relative performance regime generates higher surpluses while, for others (high inequality, extreme values for wealth), the group regime is more efficient.
Next, we recompute programs 1 and 2 with another informational regime, say, z. Under z, after the realization of output, ω is observed and consumption can be conditional on it. That is, we assume that F z = {{1}, {2}}. Figure 2 shows the difference between the surplus obtained under z and z for relative performance firms, and figure 3 shows the same result for the group firms . It is clear that, under both regimes, there is a surplus gain from a finer informational set. Notice that this example is an extreme case that makes it easy to understand the gains from information: under state 2, there is no dependency of output on effort. This means that making consumption conditional on output given state 2 does not provide any additional incentive for high effort. So, conditional on state 2 full insurance is optimal, but this can only be imposed when there is information about state.
However, the gains from information are unequal across regimes. In Particular, in the area where relative performance dominates under z, the increment in surplus from changing to z under groups is bigger than under relative performance. This is so that, with full information, or z, the groups regime always dominate. 
Complete Characterization of Firms
From the analysis presented, is possible to fully characterize the contracts under both regimes just from the type of organization, informational regime, amounts of capital and utility promises for all individuals. The assignment of individuals to different firms and the implicit choices of organization and investment on information is determined by a general equilibrium model where commodities are position in an organization. This market is described using the set of potential firms, which is defined as B = {b = (o, z, k, v(1), v(2))}, where o is the type of organization (group or relative performance firm), z is the information regime, k is the amount of capital and v(j) is the utility promise of the j th position in the firm.
Competitive Equilibrium with Endogenous Organization
This section formulates a competitive equilibrium with endogenous organizations and informational regimes. As stated earlier, we consider only two types of firms, relative-performance and group-evaluation firms, discussed in the previous section. It is worthy of emphasis that there is a continuum of agents. As a result, a lottery will be interpreted as a fraction of agents.
Consumption Possibility Set
Let B be a finite set of all potential firms (optimal contracts with different capital input, different organizational and informational regimes, and different promised utility levels). A typical firm b Denote the probability of an agent type i is working at position j in firm b ∈ B by x i (b, j).
With continuum of agents, x i (b, j) can be interpreted as the fraction of agent assigned to a bundle (b, j).
As a probability measure, a lottery must satisfy
which is called a probability constraint.
The consumption possibility set is then defined by
The linearity of the constraints ensures the convexity of the consumption possibility set X i .
The preferences over X i are defined accordingly as 
Pareto Optimal Allocations
Each viable firm must have every positions filled. This gives us a club or matching condition (see Prescott and Townsend, 2006) : for each firm b,
where δ (b) is the measure of active firm b.
The average consumption must be equal to the average production. In other words, the average net transfers from all firms f all types must be zero. The resource constraint is given by
where S (b) is the average or expected surplus of firms type b.
The resource constraint for capital is given by
where C(b) = C(z(b)) is the information cost incurring to a firm b with an informational regime F z . This constraint states that average capital input and information cost (in unit of capital) is no larger than the average endowment of capital available. The first term on the LHS is the average capital input. The second term is the average information cost. The RHS is the average endowment of capital.
We characterize the constrained optimality using the following Pareto program. Let λ i ≥ 0 be the Pareto weight of agent type i. There is no loss of generality to normalize the weights such that i λ i = 1. A constrained Pareto optimal allocation solves the following Pareto program.
Pareto Program
subject to
Note that the Pareto program includes all incentive constraints which are embedded in the grids of potential firms.
It is clear that the objective function is linear in x, and thereby it is continuous and weakly concave. As discussed earlier, the feasible set X is non-empty, compact, and convex. Therefore, a solution to the Pareto program for given positive Pareto weights exists and is a global maximum.
The proof of the equivalence between Pareto optimal allocations and the solutions to the program is omitted for brevity (see Prescott and Townsend, 1984b , for a similar proof).
Competitive Equilibrium
Following Prescott and Townsend (2006) , we define Walrasian equilibrium as follows.
Let P (b, j) be the price of a bundle (b, j) or the price of the j th position in firm b. Note that the price of the capital good is 1 as it is the numeraire good. Each agent is infinitesimally small relative to the entire economy and will take all prices as given. The market-makers introduced below will also act competitively.
Workers: Each agent i, taking prices P (b, j) as given, chooses x i in period t = 0 to maximize his utility:
subject to the probability constraint
and the budget constraint
The budget constraint (34) states that the agent sells all her endowment κ i and uses this income to buy lotteries x i .
Each agent then is assigned to a firm according to the lottery by market-makers. With the continuum of agents, the probability of the lottery can be interpreted as a fraction of agents.
Market-Makers:
The primary role of a market-maker is to create firms by assigning workers to organizations and generate information about aggregate states. With constant returns to scale, the profit of a market-maker must be zero and the number of market-makers becomes irrelevant.
Therefore, without loss of generality we assume there is one representative market-maker, which takes prices as given.
In particular, the market-maker buys consumption goods and produce firms. The market-maker issues (sells) y (b, j) ∈ R + units of each bundle (b, j), at the unit price P (b, j). By doing so, he has to create δ(b) units of firms b. Note that the market-maker can issue any non-negative number of a bundle; that is, the number of a bundle issued does not have to be between zero and one and is not a lottery. It is the number of bundles. Let y ∈ L be the vector of the number of bundles issued.
By issuing or selling (b, j), the market-maker promises to deliver state-contingent transfers −S (b) in units of consumption. The average net transfers of all firms must be no more than zero.
The market-clearing constraint for the surplus is then
This transfers can be interpreted as state-contingent financial contracts among firms.
By creating δ(b) units of firms b, the market-maker must fill all positions within the firms: for each b,
The market-maker must deliver the promised capital to each firm b, k(b). In addition, it must pay for the information C(b). It ensures that by buying K units of capital from individuals:
The objective of a market-maker is to maximize its profit by choosing (δ, y, K), taking prices (35)- (37). The first term is the total revenue of the market-maker and the bracketed term denotes its total (market) cost.
Using the club or matching condition, (36), we can rewrite
Using the above condition and (37), we can rewrite the the problem as
where P S is the Lagrange multiplier for the surplus constraint (37). This profit-maximization problem is a well-defined linear program whose (linear) constraints satisfy Slater's condition (Uzawa (1958) ). In addition, the existence of an optimum to the market-maker's problem requires that for any bundle (b, j),
where it holds with equality if y (b, j) > 0. Here j P (b, j) is the revenue from the sale of the memberships of firm b. This condition is in fact the necessary and sufficient condition for the saddle-point problem (38).
Define k(b) + C(b) as the input cost of the creating firm b firm, and − P S S (b) as its financing cost. The market-maker considers the sum of both input cost and financing cost as its total cost for creating a firm. The optimal condition states that the market-maker will create a firm only if it does not cause a total loss. On the other hand, the revenue cannot be strictly larger than the total cost. Otherwise, the market-maker will create an unbounded amount of such firm, which cannot be in equilibrium. In addition, the total profit of the market-maker in equilibrium is zero.
Market Clearing: The market-clearing condition for capital input is
Similarly, the market-clearing conditions for lotteries are
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a specification of allocation (x, y, δ), and the price of a position j in a firm b,P (b, j), such that (i) for each i, x i ∈ X i solves (32) subject to (34), taking prices P (b, j) as given,
(ii) for the market-maker, y, δ, P S solves (38), taking prices P (b, j) as given, (iii) markets for capital input and lotteries clear, i.e. (40)- (41) hold,
Existence and Welfare Theorems
As in the classical general equilibrium model, the economy is a well-defined convex economy, i.e., the commodity space is Euclidean, the consumption set is compact and convex, the utility function is linear. As a result, the first and second welfare theorems hold, and a competitive equilibrium exists. In particular, this section proves that the competitive equilibrium is constrained optimal and any constrained optimal allocation can be supported by a competitive equilibrium with transfers.
Then, we will use Negishi's method to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
The standard contradiction argument will be used to prove the following first welfare theorem.
We also assume that there is no local satiation point in the consumption set.
Assumption 1. For any x i ∈ X i , there existsx i ∈ X i such that
where U i x i is the expected utility of agent i derived from allocation x i .
This assumption is easily satisfied using reasonable specifications of the grid of promised utility.
For example, with a strictly increasing utility function, if we include a very large promised utility into the grid (larger than what can be attained with endowments), then the local nonsatiation assumption will be satisfied. The Second Welfare theorem states that any Pareto optimal allocation, corresponding to strictly positive Pareto weights, can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with transfers, precisely defined later. The standard approach applies here. In particular, we will first prove that any constrained optimal allocation can be decentralized as a compensated equilibrium. To prove this result, we show that a solution to the Pareto program is also a solution to expenditure minimization and profit maximization problems in equilibrium. Since all the optimization problems are welldefined concave problems, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient. Hence, we will
show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of Pareto program are equivalent to the ones of consumers' and intermediary's problems in equilibrium. In addition, the resource constraints in the Pareto programs are equivalent to the market-clearing conditions in equilibrium. Then, we will use a standard cheaper-point argument (see Debreu, 1954) to show that any compensated equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium with transfers.
Theorem 2. Any Pareto optimal allocation corresponding with strictly positive Pareto weights λ h > 0, ∀h can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with transfers.
We use Negishi's mapping method (Negishi, 1960) to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium. The proof benefits from the second welfare theorem. Specifically, a part of the mapping applies the theorem in that the solution to the Pareto program is a competitive equilibrium with transfers. We can show that a fixed-point of the mapping exists and it represents a competitive equilibrium without transfers.
Theorem 3. For any positive endowments, a competitive equilibrium exists.
Concluding Remarks and Next Steps
In this paper, we extended the multiagent moral hazard model of Holmström and Milgrom (1990) in two dimensions: we added costly observability of aggregate states and descentralized the model as a competitive equilibrium. We present theoretical end numerical (for a more general case) results
showing that both regimes can be optimal, but information about aggregate states benefit mostly cooperative groups. These result suggest that the emergence of cooperative behavior may be related with increasing technology and lowering costs of information. It also suggests a subtler relationship between organization and correlation in outputs: when organizational choice and investment on information are modeled jointly, the prevalence of individualistic competitive arrangements is not necessarily higher when outputs are more correlated (as in Holmström and Milgrom, 1990; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1991; Itoh, 1993) . Modeling these choices jointly should help interpreting data about cooperative behavior and distribution of individual outputs. This is work in progress, and at this stage we did not explore much the subtleties of the interaction between information and organization. We just presented a general setup and argued that the welfare theorems are valid, which determines optimality of the organizational formats determined by the model. The study of the interplay between information and organization is the next step in this research. In a first stage we will follow Prescott and Townsend (2006) and solve the model numerically for several distributions of endowments. We believe the results can potentially be used to support empirical studies about endogenous organization. Also, as in Prescott and Townsend (2006) , the equilibrium analysis will provide an ingredient that is missing in the standard model of Holmström and Milgrom (1990) : optimal matching between agents with heterogeneous endowments. Finally, in a later stage of the research we will follow Madeira and Townsend (2008) and create a dynamic version of the model. This could help understanding how investment on information about common shocks and organization interact dynamically.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Suppose there are two possible levels for effort and output. Suppose also that F z = w 1 , ..., w S . Then, any relative performance arrangement with u 1 =u 2 generates a surplus that is not higher than some feasible contract under groups that generate the same amount of utility to the agents. Further, when the optimal level of effort under relative performance is the high one, there is a group contract that generates a higher surplus with the same utility for agents.
Proof. For expositional convenience, let p s be the probability of state s and define p l hs as the probability of low output when state is s and effort is high. Define accordingly p l ls , p h ls and p h hs . Take some relative performance arrangement. Since u 1 = u 2 , one individual does not inform about the other, and u(c) is concave, we can assume, without loss of generality, that there is a symmetric solution with the consumption of agent i, c i = c q s in the case of individual output q and state s. Now, let us consider that for each state s, we determine the following group arrangement: when the state is s,and the output of both individuals is high, c 1 = c 2 = c h s with probability 1. When the state is s and the output of both individuals is low, c 1 = c 2 = c l s with probability one. When only one individual has high output, c 1 = c 2 = c m s with probability one, where u(c m s ) = 0.5u(c l s ) + 0.5u(c h s ). This implies that the weighted utility of a group with µ equal to {0.5, 0.5} with the recommended amount of effort is: The last equality comes from the fact that p l hs + p h hs = 1 . In the relative performance regime, the gain from higher consumption given high effort perfectly compensates the higher disutility of high which implies that the group has no gain in adopting low effort for one individual. Straightforward analogous procedure reveals that the group also does not have any incentive to adopt low effort by both individuals. Clearly, the participation, mother nature and compatibility with state distribution constraints are valid. However, since u is strictly convex, c m s < (c h s + c l s )/2, which implies that the group regime produce the same utility pair with lower cost, and higher surplus.
Q.E.D.
